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1 Introduction
There are many situations in which arguments are exchanged, as in lobbying, public discus-
sions of economic policies, the academic publishing process, etc. Arguments have an inherent
meaning and are not cheap talk. We think that many arguments, like logical arguments or a
regression analysis on a public database, can be viewed as hard (i.e., non-manipulable) and
imperfect decision relevant evidence.2 Furthermore, arguments often have to be acquired.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) describe a trial as a public experiment yielding an argument.
The prosecutor can design the error probabilities in order to achieve his objectives. The error
probabilities can be affected, e.g., by structuring the examination of witnesses in court. They
determine the prosecutor’s optimal experiment for persuading a Bayesian judge.
While a public experiment is an interesting case for generating an argument, there is an
abundance of situations in which arguments stem from sequential private experimentation.
For example, if a sender wants to persuade a receiver with logical arguments, then he runs a
series of thought experiments.3 He privately chooses the properties of each experiment, e.g.,
by choosing the conceptual framework from which to draw a set of specific assumptions. The
outcome of each thought experiment is privately observed. Naturally, he may run as many
thought experiments with properties of his choice (depending on what he has learnt from
previous experimentation) as desired and selectively reveal the results. If a sender instead
wants to persuade with an empirical analysis using a public database, then he may run a series
of regressions. By choosing the econometric method and the model specification he chooses the
properties of each experiment. Again experimentation is sequential and the privately observed
results are revealed selectively.
This paper studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a Bayesian receiver
by providing experimental evidence that stems from sequential experimentation. Information
acquisition occurs in private and the experimental evidence can be selectively revealed. We
2Once a regression method is described and the database is public, manipulation is not possible. We make
a similar case for logical arguments in footnote 3. Such arguments have persuasive power and, hence, they can
be viewed as decision relevant. Naturally, they are also imperfect.
3Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014) interpret, e.g., logical arguments as decision relevant hard information
that result from experimentation: If the assumptions underlying a logical argument are revealed, then they
cannot be manipulated. The deductions are logical and logic cannot be manipulated. Logical arguments
have persuasive power, therefore, they can be viewed as signals about a decision relevant state of the world.
The signals are imperfect, as the underlying assumptions do not cover every real world aspect. A thought
experiment (i.e., drawing a set of assumptions and making a deduction) yields a signal. For such arguments
the assumption that they are acquired in private by running a series of thought experiments and selectively
revealed for persuasion is natural.
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assume that an experimental outcome is hard evidence, that the sender designs the precision
of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history and that his decision to continue
experimenting also depends on the experimentation history.
If arguments stem from sequential private experimentation and are selectively revealed,
then the revealed evidence should not be taken at face value. The value of such arguments
depends on the equilibrium experimentation plan, which in turn is influenced by experimen-
tation costs and the sender’s benefit from the receiver’s decision. An experimentation plan in
our model is a complex object, since the sender can make many history dependent choices.
The sender also has considerable degrees of freedom regarding the messages that he can send,
as he may reveal any subset of the acquired evidence, including “counterarguments”.
We derive the set of equilibria that are not Pareto dominated under private experimen-
tation for constant experimentation costs. In each of these equilibria the sender runs one
experiment and stops after observing either realization. In the sender preferred equilibrium
the precision of the experiment is suffi ciently high such that the sender is just deterred from
continuing experimentation after observing an adverse outcome. In any other equilibrium that
is not Pareto dominated the precision is even higher. The persuasion probability in any such
equilibrium is lower than under public experimentation. Private experimentation, thus, limits
the extent to which persuasion is possible.
We compare the payoffs under public and private experimentation. Under private ex-
perimentation the sender is worse off than under public experimentation due to the lower
persuasion probability. The receiver on the other hand is better off in each of these equilibria
under private experimentation due to the higher precision of the experiment.
As an application consider a pharmaceutical company (the sender) that attempts to per-
suade the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (the receiver) to approve a newly developed
drug. Given the enormous R&D costs in the pharmaceutical industry, it is plausible that
the company prefers that a new drug is approved, even if its merits are doubtful. The FDA
instead would like to make the “appropriate”decision, which could be against the company.
The FDA mainly has to rely on tests, e.g., clinical studies, provided by the company, which
in turn has an incentive to behave strategically. The decision quality can be influenced by the
rules under which evidence can be acquired and revealed and what evidence is permitted to
be considered as decision relevant. The evidence production may be designed as public, by
imposing severe penalties if this rule is violated, or as private. Our paper suggests that the
FDA would be better off under the private scheme, but the company would benefit more from
public experimentation.
We analyze the impact of the sender’s stakes on the decision quality. We compare a
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situation where a sender does not care much about his favored decision with a situation where
he cares substantially. We find that the decision quality in any equilibrium that is not Pareto
dominated in the former case is lower than in any equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated
in the latter case. In a context where an interested party (like a lobby, student, researcher,
etc.) tries to persuade a decision maker (like a politician, teacher, editor, etc.) to choose a
favorable action (like a policy, a better mark in the exam, the publication of a paper, etc.)
this means that the decision maker is better off the more the interested party benefits from
a favorable decision. The interested party then has to provide higher quality information in
order to be able to commit not to run additional private experiments after an initial failure.
We further find that Kamenica and Gentzkow’s (2011) concavication approach for the
derivation of the sender’s optimal experiment in general cannot be applied in the case of
private experimentation, as the sender may have an incentive to keep an adverse outcome of
such an experiment secret and to continue experimenting if costs are low.
2 Literature
Our paper is related to the extensive literature on persuasion (e.g., Jovanovic 1982, Milgrom
and Roberts 1986, Glazer and Rubinstein 2001, 2004, 2006). As ours, some papers combine
information acquisition with persuasion (e.g., Celik 2003, Brocas and Carillo 2008, Henry
2009, Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011, Gentzkow and Kamenica 2014, 2016, Felgenhauer and
Schulte 2014).4
Henry (2009) and Brocas and Carillo (2008) investigate private experimentation in settings
where the receiver knows or can deduce the number of experiments that the sender ran. Their
models allow for an unraveling argument à la Milgrom and Roberts (1986). However, given
that experimentation occurs in private and is sequential, we think that it is more natural
that the decision to continue experimenting is history dependent and unobservable.5 Sceptical
4There is also a literature on strategic experimentation (e.g., Rothschild 1974, Aghion et al.1991, Bolton
and Harris 1999, Keller et al. 2005 and Rosenberg et al. 2007). However, in contrast to this literature on bandit
problems the purpose of experimentation here is the design of costly signals. For a survey see Bergemann and
Välimäki (2008). Experimentation in our sense is also analyzed in papers dealing with the classical problem
of sequential analysis (e.g., Moscarini and Smith 2001).
5For example, if the sender finds too many unfavorable results in the first experiments, then he knows that
he cannot persuade the receiver by conducting the remaining experiments. As experimentation is private, he
cannot be forced to continue costly experimentation until the ex ante determined number of experiments is
conducted. Baliga and Ely (2016) instead study a repeated receiver - sender interaction where the receiver
makes history dependent choices which leads to a commitment problem on the receiver’s side.
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beliefs à la Milgrom and Roberts are not helpful in such a setting: The receiver, in general,
cannot deduce the number of experiments that the sender ran, she only knows the equilibrium
experimentation plan.6 Nevertheless, in our paper it turns out that the sender runs a single
experiment in any equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated and, hence, this experiment is
basically public.
The papers that are most closely related to ours are Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and
Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014), in the following KG and FS, respectively. KG study persua-
sion via a costless public experiment, where the sender can freely design the experiment. They
apply a concavication approach in the context of persuasion that enables the determination
of the sender’s optimal experiment for persuading a Bayesian receiver.7 Our assumptions re-
garding the players’preferences and the experimentation technology resemble KG’s model of
public experimentation. Their setup is then extended in order to capture the effects of private
experimentation. FS also study private experimentation, but with an exogenously fixed pre-
cision of the experiments. The current paper generalizes FS by endogenizing the precision.8
We discuss the contribution of our paper relative to FS in detail in section 9.
3 Model
3.1 Preferences
A receiver chooses action a ∈ A, with A = {a1, a2}. Her payoff depends on her action and
an unknown state of the world ω ∈ Ω, with Ω = {ω1, ω2} and prob{ω = ω1} = 1/2. The
receiver’s utility is
ω = ω1 ω = ω2
a = a1 1 1− pd
a = a2 pd 1
6In a persuasion setting with a Poisson evidence production technology, Celik (2003) also finds that no
productive fully revealing equilibrium exists if the sender is ex ante uninformed about the state.
7Aumann and Maschler (1995) use the concavication approach prior to KG in a context with incomplete
information in which a fixed zero-sum game is infinitely often repeated. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) study
KG’s setup with costly experimentation. They show that KG’s concavication approach extends to settings
where the costs of a signal are proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. Gentzkow and Kamenica
(2016) study competition between several senders who try to persuade a receiver.
8Felgenhauer (2016) studies endogenous persuasion where the receiver may not pay attention to the per-
suasion attempt.
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with pd ∈ (1/2, 1). The receiver, thus, would like to match the decision a with the state
of the world ω if she knew ω. At the optimum she only chooses a = a1 if her posterior belief
passes the “threshold of doubt” pd, i.e., the posterior that ω = ω1 must be weakly greater
than pd.
There is a sender who prefers a = a1 regardless of ω. His prior belief is also prob{ω =
ω1} = 1/2. His gross utility is U if a = a1 and 0 otherwise. Experimentation costs have to be
subtracted from the gross utility.
3.2 Experimentation
The sender has access to an experimentation technology that can generate signals about ω.
The outcome of experiment τ is στ ∈ {s1, s2}. We call s1 a “positive outcome” and s2 an
“adverse outcome”. The precision of an experiment τ is πτ = (πτ (s1 | ω1), πτ (s2 | ω2)),
with πτ (sj | ωj) = prob{στ = sj | ω = ωj}, πτ (sj | ωj) ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {1, 2}. Let πτ (s1 |
ω1) ≥ 1 − πτ (s2 | ω2), i.e., a positive outcome στ = s1 is more likely if ω = ω1 than if
ω = ω2. We say that the precision of an experiment τ increases if ceteris paribus either
πτ (s1 | ω1) increases or πτ (s2 | ω2) increases or both increase.9 The costs of running an
experiment are c ≥ 0.10 The experimentation history after the first t experiments is denoted
by h = {(σj, πj)}j=1,...,t. The sender chooses the precision for each experiment that he runs
contingent on the experimentation history.
3.3 Messages
The sender cannot manipulate or make up experimental outcomes, i.e., each outcome is “hard”
information. The sender’s message is denoted by m = {(σi, πi)}i. Note that the receiver does
not only observe the outcomes contained in a message, but also the precision of the experiments
with which these outcomes were generated.11 Let M∗ be the set of messages that are sent
with a positive probability on the equilibrium path and let m∗ be an element of M∗.
9Consider experiments τ and τ ′ with πτ (s1 | ω1) ≥ πτ ′(s1 | ω1) and πτ (s2 | ω2) ≥ πτ ′(s2 | ω2) with at
least one strict inequality, i.e., experiment τ has the higher precision. According to the Blackwell criterion
experiment τ is at least as informative as experiment τ ′.
10In the online appendix we discuss alternative cost structures. We derive a suffi cient condition such that
the sender runs a single experiment in the sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation if
experimentation costs are not constant.
11The receiver observes the properties of an experiment, once the outcome of this experiment is presented.
This assumption is natural in many applications. E.g., if a theoretical argument is considered as evidence,
then a scientific audience, e.g., referees, editors or seminar participants, can assess its quality.
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Under private experimentation the receiver observes messagem but she cannot observe the
experimentation history h at which the sender stops experimenting. A messagem = {(σi, πi)}i
is feasible given history h if (σi, πi) ∈ h for each i. The assumption that information is hard
implies that the sender can only send feasible messages. The sender cannot prove that he did
not conduct a particular experiment.
Under public experimentation the receiver observes the experimentation history h at which
the sender stops experimenting, i.e., m = h.
3.4 Timing and strategies
The sender moves first. His strategy specifies his behavior at each experimentation history h
that he may observe. At each h the sender may either continue experimenting with a further
experiment with a history dependent precision or he may stop experimenting and send his
message.12 The receiver’s strategy specifies an action for each message that she may observe.
4 Equilibrium concept
Our equilibrium concept is weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Off-the-equilibrium path beliefs
have to satisfy that the sender cannot signal what he does not know.13
4.1 Equilibrium conditions under private experimentation
4.1.1 The sender’s equilibrium strategy
The sender at each h in equilibrium chooses either the precision of the next experiment or
a feasible message such that his continuation payoff at h is maximized given the anticipated
12Under private experimentation we exclude the possibility of inferring information from the length of the
experimentation phase. Hopenhayn and Squintani (2011) study in a different context the case where the
decision maker can deduce something from the time elapsed until he receives information. A longer period
may, e.g., suggest many failed experiments or that the sender ran a complex experiment. Our model abstracts
from these issues. Often experiments differ regarding the time they require until completed and it is diffi cult
to deduce information from the time elapsed.
13To illustrate the implications consider public experimentation, where the experimentation history is com-
mon knowledge. If the sender deviates from his equilibrium experimentation plan, then this assumption implies
that the receiver cannot have arbitrary beliefs with respect to the state of the world, since the sender does not
have additional information about the state. It follows that the off-the-equilibrium path beliefs with respect
to the state of the world have to be Bayesian based exclusively on the publicly observable experimentation
history under public experimentation.
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equilibrium behavior. I.e., at each history h we have the following. Let h̃ be a history where
either history h1 = (h, (στ = s1, πτ )) or history h2 = (h, (στ = s2, πτ )) is a subhistory, with
experiment τ being the next experiment at history h. In equilibrium the sender at each h
anticipates (i) his equilibrium behavior at any history h̃ for each πτ and (ii) the receiver’s
equilibrium response to any message that the sender may send. If the sender in equilibrium
runs a further experiment τ at h, then the precision of this experiment πτ satisfies
πτ ∈ arg max
πτ
prob{στ = s1 | h, πτ}Υ(h1) + prob{στ = s2 | h, πτ}Υ(h2)− c,
where Υ(.) denotes the sender’s equilibrium continuation utility given the anticipated behav-
ior (i) and (ii). If he sends a feasible message at h that induces a = a2 according to the
receiver’s equilibrium strategy, then the sender’s continuation payoff at h is 0. If he sends a
feasible message at h that induces a = a1, then his continuation payoff at h is U . Continuing
experimentation is equilibrium behavior if h is such that a message inducing a = a1 is not
feasible and max
πτ
prob{στ = s1 | h, πτ}Υ(h1) + prob{στ = s2 | h, πτ}Υ(h2)− c > 0. Otherwise,
he sends a best feasible message.
4.1.2 The receiver’s equilibrium strategy
In equilibrium the receiver’s action is optimal for each message that she may observe given
her beliefs, i.e., we have
a(m) =
{
a1 if prob{ω = ω1 | m} ≥ pd
a2 otherwise
for each potential message m, where prob{ω = ω1 | m} is the receiver’s posterior belief that
the state is ω = ω1 upon observing message m.
4.1.3 Equilibrium beliefs
The receiver does not observe the sender’s experimentation history, but in equilibrium she
deduces the sender’s equilibrium behavior at each history h that he may face. This allows
her to determine a Bayesian posterior belief about the sender’s type, i.e., the experimentation
history that he faces when sending the message, for each potential on the equilibrium path
message. Let H(m) be the set of all histories that are such that the sender sends message
m according to his equilibrium strategy. The probability with which each of these histories
occurs in each state ω can be deduced from the sender’s equilibrium strategy. Hence, if the
receiver deduces that the sender follows his equilibrium strategy and she observes some on the
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equilibrium path message m∗, then she can determine her on the equilibrium path Bayesian
belief
prob{ω = ω1 | m∗} =
∑
h∈H(m∗)
prob{h | ω1}∑
h∈H(m∗)
prob{h | ω1}+
∑
h∈H(m∗)
prob{h | ω2}
.
If the receiver observes some off-the-equilibrium path message m = {(σi, πi)}i, then we
assume that she only considers experimentation histories h as possible with (σi, πi) ∈ h for
each i. This implies prob{ω = ω1 | m} = 1 if m contains at least one positive outcome from
an experiment τ with precision (πτ (s1 | ω1), 1) with some πτ (s1 | ω1) ∈ (0, 1].14 Otherwise, we
do not impose restrictions on off-the-equilibrium path beliefs.
4.2 Equilibrium conditions under public experimentation
The equilibrium conditions for the sender’s and the receiver’s equilibrium strategy are analo-
gous to the conditions under private experimentation with the modification that m = h at any
history h where the sender stops experimenting. As the receiver observes the experimentation
history, she observes the sender’s type. If the sender stops experimenting at some history h,
then her posterior belief that the state is ω = ω1 on and off-the-equilibrium path is
prob{ω = ω1 | h} =
prob{h | ω1}
prob{h | ω1}+ prob{h | ω2}
.
5 Public experimentation
In this section we derive the equilibrium behavior under public experimentation. It is conve-
nient to first suppose that the sender can run a single public experiment with a precision of his
choice. The other assumptions are maintained. KG use a concavication approach to solve the
sender’s problem to determine the optimal experiment with which he can persuade a Bayesian
receiver. The sender anticipates a distribution of the receiver’s optimal actions in response
to the posterior distributions that result from his experiment. KG show (i) that the sender’s
payoff can be described as a value function over the posterior generated by the experimental
outcome and (ii) that for any distribution of posterior beliefs whose expectation is the prior,
there exists an experiment that induces that distribution of posteriors. They find that the
14Any such message can only stem from experimentation histories that also contain this evidence. Each of
these histories implies that the state is ω = ω1 with certainty. Regardless of the posterior belief regarding the
histories we, thus, have prob{ω = ω1 | m} = 1.
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highest payoff that the sender can obtain is equal to the concave closure of the value function
evaluated at the prior belief.15 This determines the precision πτ of the optimal experiment.
Figure 1 shows the sender’s value function that depends on the receiver’s posterior proba-
bility prob{ω = ω1 | m} ≡ µ1 that the state is ω1 and the value function’s concavication. The
highest payoff that the sender can obtain is equal to the concave closure of the value function
evaluated at the prior belief 1/2, i.e., in this case it is equal to U
2pd
− c.
U-c
1/2 µ1pd
-c
U/2pd-c
0
Figure 1: The sender’s value function (solid curve) and its concavication (dotted curve)
In order to maximize the persuasion probability, the sender designs the experiment yielding
posteriors µ1 = 0 and µ1 = pd such that the expected posterior is µ1 = 1/2, i.e., he chooses
πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 and πτ (s2 | ω2) = 2pd−1pd . The intuition for πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 is that the sender
does not want to obtain an adverse outcome if ω = ω1. He also wants to obtain a positive
outcome when the state is bad ω = ω2, but he has to choose πτ (s2 | ω2) such that he can still
persuade the receiver. Therefore, he maximizes prob{s1 | ω2} subject to prob{ω1 | s1} ≥ pd.
The persuasion probability is maximal if prob{ω1 | s1} = pd, i.e., such that the receiver is
indifferent between a1 and a2 upon the observation of a signal realization in the sender’s favor,
yielding πτ (s2 | ω2) = 2pd−1pd .
Using the above analysis we obtain the following lemma if the sender can run multiple
public experiments.
Lemma 1 Consider public experimentation. (i) If U/c ∈ [0, 2pd), then there is no equilibrium
with experimentation. (ii) If U/c ∈ [2pd,∞), then there is an equilibrium in which the sender
on the equilibrium path runs one experiment with precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
) and no further
experiment. (iii) If U/c ∈ (2pd,∞), then the equilibrium described in (ii) is unique.
15The concavication of the value function is the smallest concave function everywhere weakly above the
value function.
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If U/c is too small, i.e., U/c ∈ [0, 2pd), then the probability to obtain U is not high enough
for the sender to justify the costs of running an experiment with πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
). If U/c > 2pd,
then the receiver is better off to run an experiment with precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
) than to
run any other experiment or not to experiment. He does not want to continue experimenting
after observing an adverse outcome of the experiment with precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
), as this
outcome implies that the state is ω2 with certainty and this posterior belief cannot be changed
by further experimentation.
6 Private experimentation
Consider costly private experimentation, where the receiver cannot observe the experimen-
tation history and the sender cannot commit not to run additional private experiments. In
equilibrium the receiver only chooses the sender’s preferred action a = a1 if her posterior belief
that ω = ω1 upon observing his message exceeds her threshold of doubt pd. The receiver’s
posterior belief that the state is ω = ω1 upon the observation of some message depends on
the sender’s strategy.
The following lemma asserts that in any equilibrium with persuasion the sender stops
experimenting unsuccessfully at some history h where (i) the posterior at h that the state is
ω = ω1 is below the prior belief 1/2 and where (ii) history h does not contain evidence that
he can use for persuasion. Only in this case the receiver’s threshold of doubt may be passed
and, thus, persuasion may be possible. Denote the sender’s posterior belief that the state is
ω = ω1 given that he faces experimentation history h by prob{ω = ω1 | h} ≡ µ1.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium with persuasion under private experimentation the sender stops
experimenting unsuccessfully at some posterior µ1 < 1/2 if he has not yet found an outcome
that is part of some m∗ ∈M∗ with which he can persuade the receiver to choose a = a1.
Consider, e.g., an equilibrium with persuasion in which there is no on the equilibrium path
history where the sender never stops experimenting unsuccessfully. In this equilibrium the
sender, thus, runs a finite number of experiments. He eventually either stops experimenting
successfully or he stops unsuccessfully. If there is no µ1 as described in the lemma, then the
sender only stops experimenting unsuccessfully if his posterior is above 1/2, as shown in the
appendix. Bayesian plausibility requires that there is then some persuasive message sent after
successful experimentation for which the receiver’s posterior belief that the state is ω = ω1 is
below 1/2. As this posterior is below the threshold of doubt pd, the receiver should not be
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persuaded by such a message, which violates an equilibrium condition. The other potential
equilibria are discussed in the appendix.
In the next subsection we analyze whether a similar equilibrium exists as under public
experimentation. Then we derive the sender preferred equilibrium, which enables us to char-
acterize the set of equilibria that are not Pareto dominated in the final subsection.
6.1 Experimentation as under the public scheme
We now determine the circumstances where a similar equilibrium exists under private ex-
perimentation as under public experimentation and where this is not the case. Consider a
potential equilibrium in which the sender starts experimenting with an experiment, where the
precision of this experiment is derived with the concavication approach, then stops after each
outcome and sends a message containing the corresponding outcome. The receiver’s action
after each message equals her action after the corresponding outcome if the experiment is run
under public experimentation.
Lemma 3 Consider private experimentation. (i) If U/c ∈ [0, 2pd), then there is no equilib-
rium with experimentation. (ii) If U/c ∈ [2pd, pd1−pd ], then there is an equilibrium in which
the sender on the equilibrium path runs one experiment with precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
) and no
further experiment. (iii) If U/c ∈ ( pd
1−pd ,∞), then there is no equilibrium as described in (ii).
Analogous to public experimentation there is no equilibrium with experimentation if U/c
is too small, i.e., U/c ∈ [0, 2pd). If U/c ∈ [2pd, pd1−pd ], then there is an equilibrium in which the
sender on the equilibrium path runs a single experiment and this experiment has the same
precision as under public experimentation. The receiver is persuaded and chooses a = a1 if
the sender presents a corresponding positive outcome. U/c ≤ pd
1−pd implies that the sender
does not have an incentive to continue experimenting privately after an adverse outcome. This
equilibrium is better for the sender than any other equilibrium under private experimentation,
as the sender runs a single experiment with the maximum persuasion probability. If U/c is
above pd
1−pd , then there is no equilibrium under private experimentation where the sender on the
equilibrium path runs one experiment with the same precision as under public experimentation
and no further experiments. Suppose instead that there is such an equilibrium. If the outcome
of the first experiment is s2, then the sender knows that ω = ω2. It is worthwhile to continue
experimenting, given that the receiver can be persuaded with one positive outcome from an
experiment with precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
), if U/c > 1
(1− 2pd−1
pd
)
= pd
1−pd . Consequently, this
cannot be an equilibrium if U/c is suffi ciently high. The sender with high stakes cannot
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commit not to run a further experiment if he observes an outcome of the first experiment that
he does not like and he can hide an adverse outcome of the first experiment.
KG’s concavication approach is very useful for determining the equilibrium under public
experimentation. However, it is not applicable in many situations where the evidence for
persuasion is collected via sequential private experimentation with selective information rev-
elation. Consider the experiment in the unique equilibrium under public experimentation,
which is derived with the concavication approach and which has precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
). A com-
parison of Lemma 1 (ii) and Lemma 3 (iii) reveals that an analogous equilibrium does not
exist under private experimentation if U/c > pd
1−pd . Hence, if U/c >
pd
1−pd , the concavication
approach can be used under public experimentation, but not under private experimentation.
Lemmas 1 and 3 imply that the persuasion probability, the players’ payoffs, etc. are
the same under public and private experimentation if U/c ∈ [0, pd
1−pd ] given that the players
coordinate on the equilibrium described in Lemma 3 (ii) under private experimentation. The
graph in Figure 2 illustrates U/c = pd
1−pd . We have U/c ∈ [0,
pd
1−pd ] below the curve.
Figure 2: U/c = pd
1−pd
In the following we focus on the interesting case with U/c > pd
1−pd , i.e., the region above
the curve in Figure 2.
6.2 The sender preferred equilibrium
For the derivation of the set of all equilibria that are not Pareto dominated it is convenient to
first determine the sender preferred equilibrium. An equilibrium is sender preferred if there is
no other equilibrium in which the sender is strictly better off.
The sender cares about the persuasion probability and expected experimentation costs. If
U/c > pd
1−pd , then there is no equilibrium in which the sender runs a single experiment that
leads to the maximum persuasion probability as under public experimentation. The sender in
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equilibrium may run multiple experiments and may reveal more than one outcome. However,
the sender preferred equilibrium has a surprisingly simple structure.
For the derivation of the sender preferred equilibrium it is useful to characterize the sender’s
payoff in any equilibrium with persuasion. Define V2(µ1) as the sender’s expected utility if (i)
ω = ω2, (ii) he has not yet found an outcome that is an element of some persuasive message,
and (iii) he continues experimenting according to his equilibrium experimentation plan given
that he holds the posterior belief prob{ω = ω1 | h} = µ1 and given that he has not yet found
an outcome that is an element of some persuasive message. Analogously, define V1(µ1) as his
expected utility given ω = ω1. The sender’s utility if he has not yet found an outcome that
he can use for persuasion at posterior µ1 is
µ1V1(µ1) + (1− µ1)V2(µ1).
The following lemma characterizes the sender’s payoff in each state, given that he does not
yet have evidence for persuasion and given the prior belief, as well as his ex ante payoff in any
equilibrium with persuasion.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium with persuasion we have V1(12) ≥ 0 and V2(
1
2
) ≤ 0 and 1
2
V1(
1
2
)+
1
2
V2(
1
2
) ≥ 0.
1
2
V1(
1
2
) + 1
2
V2(
1
2
) ≥ 0 has to be satisfied, as the sender has to have an incentive to start
experimenting. We cannot have V1(12) < 0 and V2(
1
2
) ≤ 0, as this violates 1
2
V1(
1
2
)+ 1
2
V2(
1
2
) ≥ 0.
Similarly, we cannot have V1(12) ≤ 0 and V2(
1
2
) < 0. In the appendix we show that we cannot
have V2(12) > 0 in an equilibrium with persuasion, as the sender in this case would not stop
experimenting unsuccessfully for all posteriors µ1 < 1/2, which violates Lemma 2.
Under public experimentation we have determined the experiment that maximizes the
sender’s payoff subject to a positive outcome having the power to persuade a Bayesian re-
ceiver. Lemma 4 asserts that the sender’s commitment problem under private experimenta-
tion results in the additional constraint that V2(12) ≤ 0 in any equilibrium with persuasion.
The commitment problem limits the sender’s payoff in the state where the decision should be
against him. If instead V2(12) > 0, then he would not stop experimenting unsuccessfully at any
posterior belief µ1 < 1/2, which implies that some persuasive message m
∗ yields a posterior
µ1 < 1/2 for the receiver due to Bayesian plausibility. But then the receiver should not be
persuaded by this m∗. In the following, we show that the constraint V2(12) ≤ 0 affects the
nature of the sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation. We derive an upper
bound for the sender’s ex ante utility in any equilibrium with persuasion and then show that
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there is such an equilibrium in which the sender runs only one experiment that yields this
payoff for the sender.
The sender’s ex ante utility in any equilibrium with persuasion can be written as 1
2
V1(
1
2
) +
1
2
V2(
1
2
). An upper bound for V1(12) is U − c, i.e., if persuasion occurs in state ω1 with certainty
after the first experiment. An upper bound for V2(12) in any equilibrium with persuasion is 0
due to Lemma 4. Hence, an upper bound for the sender’s ex ante utility in any equilibrium
with persuasion is
(1)
1
2
(U − c).
Suppose the sender in a potential equilibrium runs a single experiment τ with precision πτ
and suppose that a positive outcome induces a = a1 and an adverse outcome induces a = a2.
We now maximize 1
2
V1(
1
2
) + 1
2
V2(
1
2
) with respect to πτ subject to V1(12) ≥ 0 and V2(
1
2
) ≤ 0.
We have V1(12) = πτ (s1 | ω1)U − c and V2(
1
2
) = (1 − πτ (s2 | ω2))U − c. The solution to
the maximization problem is πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 and πτ (s2 | ω2) = U−cU . The former implies
V1(
1
2
) = U − c and the latter implies V2(12) = 0. Hence, if such an equilibrium exists, then
the sender’s ex ante utility in this equilibrium is 1
2
(U − c) and it is weakly higher than in any
other equilibrium with persuasion due to (1), i.e., the equilibrium is sender preferred.
Next, we show that such an equilibrium exists. Consider a potential equilibrium with the
following properties:
(1) The sender’s first experiment has precision πτ = (1, U−cU ).
(2) The sender stops experimenting (successfully) at any history h that contains at least
one outcome στ = s1 of an experiment with πτ = (1, U−cU ).
(3) The sender stops experimenting (unsuccessfully) at any history h with prob{ω = ω1 |
h} = 0 that does not contain at least one outcome στ = s1 of an experiment with πτ = (1, U−cU ).
(4) The sender sends message m∗ = (στ , πτ ) with πτ = (1, U−cU ) for any outcome στ that
he observes after the first experiment.
(5) The sender’s remaining behavior off-the-equilibrium path is sequentially rational.
(6) The receiver chooses a = a1 if the sender sends message m∗ = (στ = s1, πτ ) with
πτ = (1,
U−c
U
) of an experiment τ . The receiver also chooses a = a1 if the sender sends a
message m that contains at least one positive outcome from an experiment with precision
(q, 1), with q ∈ (0, 1]. Otherwise she chooses a2.
(7) On the equilibrium path, i.e., upon observing messagem∗ = (στ , πτ ) with πτ = (1, U−cU ),
beliefs are formed in accordance with Bayes’Law. Upon observing an off-the-equilibrium path
message that does not contain at least one positive outcome from an experiment with precision
(q, 1), the receiver forms a probability assessment over experimentation histories such that the
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probability that ω = ω1 conditional on this assessment is below the threshold of doubt. E.g.,
she may believe that the sender privately ran a single additional experiment with precision
(1, 1) that yielded an adverse outcome. Off-the-equilibrium path beliefs upon observing a
message that contains at least one positive outcome from an experiment with precision (q, 1),
with q ∈ (0, 1], are such that the receiver thinks that ω = ω1 with certainty, as discussed in
section 4.1.3.
An equilibrium condition is that the sender stops experimenting after an adverse outcome
from the first experiment. E.g., in this case he must not have an incentive to run the same
experiment again. After observing an adverse outcome of an experiment with πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1
the sender knows that the state is ω = ω2 with certainty. The payoff from running the same
experiment again knowing that ω = ω2 is equal to (1− πτ (s2 | ω2))U − c. This payoff is equal
to V2(12) and by construction V2(
1
2
) = 0. Not running this experiment yields a payoff of 0
from stopping unsuccessfully. The sender is just deterred from running the same experiment
again after observing an adverse outcome of the first experiment, as it is suffi ciently unlikely
to obtain a positive outcome if the state is against him. In the appendix we confirm that the
remaining equilibrium conditions are also satisfied.16
Proposition 1 Consider U/c > pd
1−pd . (i) There is an equilibrium in which the sender on the
equilibrium path runs one experiment with precision πτ = (1, U−cU ) and no further experiment.
(ii) The sender strictly prefers the equilibrium in (i) to any other equilibrium with persuasion
where the sender runs another first experiment or where he runs multiple experiments on the
equilibrium path. (iii) The persuasion probability in the sender preferred equilibrium under
private experimentation is strictly lower than under public experimentation.
Proposition 1 shows that in the sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation
the sender runs a single experiment with πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 (as under public experimentation),
but with πτ (s2 | ω2) = U−cU that maximizes the persuasion probability subject to the constraint
that further experimentation after an initial adverse outcome is deterred. This limits the extent
to which persuasion is possible compared to public experimentation.
16For the sender the ex ante payoff has to be greater than zero, a deviation to start with another experiment
must not be profitable, he must not have an incentive to continue experimentation with an experiment of any
precision if he knows that ω = ω2 and it has to be optimal to make the announcements as stated above. For
the receiver the threshold of doubt has to be passed upon observing message m∗ = (στ = s1, πτ ).
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6.3 Equilibria that are not Pareto dominated
The characterization of the sender preferred equilibrium allows us to determine the set of
all equilibria that are not Pareto dominated under private experimentation. The following
proposition shows that the sender in any equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated runs only
one experiment and that the precision of this experiment is (1, πτ (s2 | ω2)). These equilibria
differ regarding πτ (s2 | ω2). The other properties of these equilibria are analogous to properties
(1) - (7) of the sender preferred equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Consider U/c > pd
1−pd . (i) There is an equilibrium in which the sender on the
equilibrium path runs one experiment with precision (1, πτ (s2 | ω2)) and no further experiment
for each πτ (s2 | ω2) ∈ [U−cU ,min{1; 2
U−c
U
}]. (ii) All equilibria not described in (i) are Pareto
dominated by some equilibrium in (i). (iii) None of the equilibria described in (i) is Pareto
dominated.
According to Proposition 2 (i) we have πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 in any equilibrium that is not
Pareto dominated. The lower bound U−c
U
for πτ (s2 | ω2) in Proposition 2 (i) is the πτ (s2 | ω2)
in the sender preferred equilibrium. The upper bound for πτ (s2 | ω2) is determined by the
equilibrium condition that the sender has to be better off from starting to experiment than
from not experimenting. This condition is satisfied if 1
2
(U − c) + 1
2
((1−πτ (s2 | ω2))U − c) ≥ 0.
The lower U/c is, the (weakly) higher the probability of a positive outcome has to be in order
to satisfy this condition. A lower πτ (s2 | ω2) ensures a higher probability that the outcome of
the experiment is positive. If U/c ≥ 2, then min{1; 2U−c
U
} = 1. The sender is just indifferent
to start experimenting with an experiment with precision (1, 1) if U/c = 2. He has a strict
incentive to start experimenting if U/c > 2. If U/c < 2 instead, then min{1; 2U−c
U
} = 2U−c
U
<
1. The ex ante probability to obtain a favorable outcome with πτ (s2 | ω2) = 2U−cU is higher
than with πτ (s2 | ω2) = 1. The sender with low stakes U/c < 2 is just indifferent to start
experimenting given that πτ (s2 | ω2) = 2U−cU .
In the following we argue that any equilibrium with persuasion not described in Proposition
2 (i) is Pareto dominated by an equilibrium in the set of equilibria described in Proposition 2
(i). There may be equilibria in which the sender runs only one experiment and there may be
equilibria with multiple experiments on the equilibrium path. For expositional convenience
we focus on parameters U/c such that the upper bound for πτ (s2 | ω2) in Proposition 2 (i) is
1 and analyze the remaining parameter constellations in the appendix.
Consider a potential equilibrium in which the sender runs only one experiment on the
equilibrium path and where this experiment has some precision (q, p), with q < 1 and p < U−c
U
.
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Such an equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the sender preferred equilibrium: The receiver’s
benefit increases in πτ (s1 | ω1) and πτ (s2 | ω2), given that the sender runs only one experiment
τ , as this experiment better predicts the state of the world. The sender is best off in the sender
preferred equilibrium by the definition of the sender preferred equilibrium.
Consider a potential equilibrium in which the sender runs only one experiment on the
equilibrium path and where this experiment has some precision (q, p), with q < 1 and p > U−c
U
.
Such an equilibrium is Pareto dominated by an equilibrium in which the sender runs one
experiment and where this experiment has precision (1, p): Analogous to the previous case,
the receiver is better off in the latter equilibrium, as the experiment in this equilibrium is
more precise. The sender is better off, as in both equilibria πτ (s2 | ω2) is the same, i.e., in
state ω = ω2 the payoff is the same, but πτ (s1 | ω1) is greater in the latter equilibrium, i.e.,
in state ω = ω1 he obtains a positive outcome with a higher probability.
The arguments for equilibria with multiple experiments on the equilibrium path are similar.
Here, an auxiliary (possibly non-equilibrium) situation can be constructed, where the sender
runs only one experiment and where the receiver only chooses a = a1 if the outcome of this
experiment is positive, that has the same probabilities to induce a = a1 in state ω1 and a = a2
in state ω2 as the equilibrium with multiple experiments.17 The receiver is as well off in the
auxiliary situation as in the equilibrium. The sender is better off, as he runs only one costly
experiment. Analogous to above and as shown in the appendix, the auxiliary situation can
then be compared from a payoffperspective with some equilibrium in the set of equilibria that
are not Pareto dominated.
As the sender’s payoff decreases in πτ (s2 | ω2) and the receiver’s payoff increases in πτ (s2 |
ω2) given that πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1, none of the equilibria described in Proposition 2 (i) is Pareto
dominated. The sender preferred equilibrium has the lowest πτ (s2 | ω2) in the set of equilibria
that are not Pareto dominated. The receiver preferred equilibrium has the highest πτ (s2 | ω2)
in this set of equilibria. If πτ (s2 | ω2) = 1 in the receiver preferred equilibrium, then the
receiver learns the state and always makes the appropriate decision.
17Given the sender’s and the receiver’s equilibrium strategy, we can determine prob{a = a1 | ω = ω1} and
prob{a = a2 | ω = ω2} in the equilibrium with multiple experiments. A single experiment with precision (q, p),
with q = prob{a = a1 | ω = ω1} and p = prob{a = a2 | ω = ω2} can be designed. In the auxiliary situation
the sender (possibly suboptimally) runs exclusively this experiment and reveals the outcome and the receiver
mechanically chooses a = a1 only after a positive outcome of this experiment. By construction, the persuasion
probability in the auxiliary situation is the same as in the equilibrium with multiple experiments.
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7 Payoff comparison of public and private experimen-
tation
We now compare the players’utilities under public and private experimentation.
Proposition 3 Consider U/c > pd
1−pd . Suppose the players coordinate on any equilibrium that
is not Pareto dominated under private experimentation. The sender strictly prefers public to
private experimentation. The receiver strictly prefers private to public experimentation.
The sender ex ante faces a commitment problem under private experimentation. Choosing
a high precision is an endogenous way of committing not to search excessively, which affects
the players’utilities.18
Consider first the sender. The equilibrium under public experimentation is such that the
sender designs a public experiment that maximizes his payoff subject to being able to persuade
a Bayesian receiver. Under private experimentation the sender’s commitment problem cre-
ates additional constraints in the maximization problem in the sender preferred equilibrium.
Therefore, he is weakly worse off in this equilibrium and, hence, in any other equilibrium
than under public experimentation. In the following we determine the sender’s payoff in the
sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation and his payoff under the public
scheme. This allows us to confirm that he is strictly better off under the latter scheme. The
persuasion probability under public experimentation is 1
2pd
. The persuasion probability in the
sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation is U+c
2U
if U/c > pd
1−pd . Under both
schemes the sender runs a single experiment, but the persuasion probability is higher under
public experimentation, rendering private experimentation less attractive for the sender.
18Henry (2009) instead studies private experimentation and mandatory disclosure in a setting where the
sender ex ante commits to run a certain number of experiments with an exogenous precision. Under private
experimentation the receiver deduces the number of experiments by an unraveling argument. Either of these
schemes can be socially optimal.
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Figure 3: The sender’s expected payoffs under public and private experimentation
Figure 3 illustrates the sender’s expected payoffs under public experimentation and in the
sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation. The dotted curve in Figure 3 is
the concave closure of the value function, as in Figure 1. Under public experimentation the
sender’s ex ante payoff is equal to the concave closure evaluated at the prior belief 1/2. The
dashed line below the concave closure corresponds to private experimentation. In contrast
to public experimentation the sender designs an experiment yielding posteriors µ1 = 0 and
µ1 =
U
U+c
with expected posterior µ1 = 1/2. His expected payoff
1
2
(U − c) is strictly lower
than his expected payoff U
2pd
− c under public experimentation, as the dashed line is strictly
below the concavication of the value function for all U/c > pd
1−pd .
Consider next the receiver. The precision of the experiment under public experimentation
is such that the receiver is just persuaded upon observing a positive outcome, i.e., the precision
is relatively low. The precision of the experiment in the sender preferred equilibrium under the
private scheme is higher in order to deter excessive experimentation. We have πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1
in both cases, but πτ (s2 | ω2) is higher under the private scheme. The receiver benefits from a
higher precision, as she makes the correct decision more often. Therefore, she is strictly better
off in the sender preferred equilibrium under the private scheme. As established in Proposition
2, πτ (s2 | ω2) is even higher in any other equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated, where
πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 in each of these equilibria, and, therefore, the receiver strictly prefers private
to public experimentation if the players coordinate on any equilibrium that is not Pareto
dominated.
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8 Comparative statics
We now study the impact of an exogenous change of U/c and pd on equilibrium behavior and
payoffs under public and private experimentation.
8.1 Public experimentation
Under public experimentation the size of U/c affects whether the sender does not experiment,
i.e., U/c < 2pd, or whether he runs an experiment in the unique equilibrium, i.e., U/c > 2pd,
but it does not have an impact on the experiment’s design in the latter case. Hence, for any
U/c > 2pd, the receiver’s utility is the same. The sender’s payoff increases in U/c.
An increase of pd increases the threshold 2pd. The higher the threshold of doubt, the lower
is the sender’s incentive to run an experiment in equilibrium. An increase of pd has an impact
on the precision of the experiment if U/c > 2pd. The precision in this case is (1,
2pd−1
pd
), where
2pd−1
pd
increases in pd. A higher threshold of doubt can only be passed if the experiment’s
precision goes up, which is mirrored by the increase of 2pd−1
pd
.
8.2 Private experimentation
Under private experimentation the size of U/c again determines whether the sender starts
experimenting. Suppose U/c > pd
1−pd . In contrast to public experimentation, a change of the
threshold of doubt pd does not have an impact on the precision of an experiment that is run
in any equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated, but an increase of pd increases the threshold
pd
1−pd .
The sender’s stakes U/c have an impact on the precision of the experiment run in the sender
preferred equilibrium and in the receiver preferred equilibrium, as U−c
U
and min{1; 2U−c
U
} de-
pend on U/c. We now analyze how the precision of the experiment, the persuasion proba-
bility and the decision quality in these equilibria are affected if the stakes U/c of the sender
change. Our interpretation of the decision quality is motivated by the receiver’s preferences.
She wants to match the state with the decision. The receiver is better off (and we say that
the decision quality increases) if either prob{a = a2 | ω = ω1} decreases without changing
prob{a = a1 | ω = ω2} or prob{a = a1 | ω = ω2} decreases keeping prob{a = a2 | ω = ω1}
constant or both decrease.
In the sender preferred equilibrium and in the receiver preferred equilibrium we have πτ (s1 |
ω1) = 1 irrespective of U/c. The stakes of the sender U/c exclusively affect πτ (s2 | ω2). In the
sender preferred equilibrium πτ (s2 | ω2) has to increase if U/c increases in order to deter the
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sender from running a second experiment if the outcome of the first experiment is adverse. In
the receiver preferred equilibrium πτ (s2 | ω2) strictly increases in U/c for small U/c and it is 1
for all U/c ≥ 2. In the former case πτ (s2 | ω2) is such that the sender is just indifferent between
starting to experiment or not. If the stakes increase, then he is willing to start experimenting
even if there is a lower probability to obtain a positive outcome due to a higher πτ (s2 | ω2).
Proposition 4 Consider private experimentation and U/c > pd
1−pd . (i) The precision of the
experiment that is run on the equilibrium path in the sender preferred equilibrium strictly
increases in U/c. It weakly increases in U/c in the receiver preferred equilibrium. (ii) The
persuasion probability in the sender preferred equilibrium strictly decreases in U/c. It weakly
decreases in U/c in the receiver preferred equilibrium. (iii) The decision quality in the sender
preferred equilibrium strictly increases in U/c. It weakly increases in U/c in the receiver
preferred equilibrium.
For each πτ (s2 | ω2) ∈ [U−cU ,min{1; 2
U−c
U
}] there is an equilibrium that is not Pareto
dominated in which the sender runs one experiment and where this experiment has precision
(1, πτ (s2 | ω2)) according to Proposition 2. All other equilibria are Pareto dominated. Hence,
an increase of U/c affects the size and “location”of the set of equilibria that are not Pareto
dominated. An increase of U/c strictly increases the lower bound U−c
U
for πτ (s2 | ω2) and it
weakly increases the upper bound min{1; 2U−c
U
}. If U/c is suffi ciently small, then we have
πτ (s2 | ω2) ∈ [U−cU , 2
U−c
U
] with 2U−c
U
< 1. An increase of the sender’s stakes to U ′/c′ implies
πτ (s2 | ω2) ∈ [U
′−c′
U ′ ,min{1; 2
U ′−c′
U ′ }]. If the increase of the stakes is suffi ciently high, i.e., if
U ′/c′ > 1
1−2U−c
U
, then these intervals for πτ (s2 | ω2) are disjunct, since U ′/c′ > 11−2U−c
U
⇔
2U−c
U
< U
′−c′
U ′ . The following proposition directly follows.
Proposition 5 Consider private experimentation. In any equilibrium that is not Pareto dom-
inated a sender with low stakes U/c ∈ ( pd
1−pd , 2) runs an experiment with a strictly lower pre-
cision than a sender with high stakes U ′/c′ > 1
1−2U−c
U
.
If, e.g., the receiver is interpreted as a politician and the sender as a lobby, then Propo-
sitions 4 and 5 suggest that the quality of informational lobbying and, hence, the decision
quality increase in the stakes of the lobby. A similar point can be made if a researcher with
career concerns is viewed as the sender and the receiver is an editor. Young researchers aspir-
ing tenure may care more about a publication in a good journal than researchers with tenure.
In order to get published in the same journal, the former may have to write higher quality
papers.
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9 Comparison with Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014)
The value of any evidence presented depends on the sender’s experimentation and informa-
tion revelation plan. Excessive private experimentation and selective information revelation
reduces the value of such evidence. FS and the current paper focus on different aspects of this
problem. In their setup with an exogenously fixed design of the experiments, FS show that
excessive experimentation can be deterred by requiring a suffi ciently high number of positive
outcomes in any message that persuades the receiver. The present paper instead focuses on
a reduction of excessive experimentation via an appropriate design of the experiments. By
granting complete flexibility, and thus generalizing FS, the same channel for deterring too
much private experimentation, i.e., requiring a high number of positive outcomes for persua-
sion, is available here. However, from a Pareto perspective equilibria are more attractive in
which excessive experimentation is prevented by an adjustment of the precision. The sender
preferred equilibrium here has a simple structure. In this equilibrium the sender runs only
one experiment and this experiment is suffi ciently precise such that further experimentation is
just deterred if its outcome is adverse. In any other equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated
the sender also runs exclusively one experiment.
Our paper compares aspects of private and public experimentation à la KG, like the players’
payoffs and the persuasion probabilities. This allows us to rank the private and the public
scheme from the sender’s and the receiver’s perspective, which is relevant, e.g., in the FDA
example. There is no such comparison in FS. KG’s concavication approach also relies on a
flexible precision. It is possible to show its limitations under private experimentation in the
current paper, but not in FS.
The comparative statics results in the current paper and in FS differ. If the sender’s ben-
efit from a favorable decision increases exogenously, then any equilibrium with persuasion in
the original situation in FS eventually ceases to exist, as the value of the formerly persuasive
evidence is diluted too much by a stronger incentive to experiment excessively. This incentive
in FS can only be counteracted by increasing the number of outcomes required for persuasion.
With a flexible design an increase of the precision of the only experiment run in the sender
preferred equilibrium deters additional private experiments. The different nature of the sender
preferred equilibrium in FS and the current paper has different welfare implications. In both
papers an equilibrium condition is that a persuasive message is such that the receiver’s thresh-
old of doubt is passed. The sender preferred equilibrium in FS is such that the threshold of
doubt is just passed, regardless of the sender’s stakes. I.e., the number of positive outcomes
that the sender has to provide for persuasion is as small as possible subject to such a message
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being persuasive. Here instead, the threshold of doubt is passed by a margin in the sender
preferred equilibrium. This margin increases in the stakes of the sender. Hence, in FS the
stakes of the sender do not matter for the receiver’s payoff, whereas here they do. In practice,
big interest groups, like industrial corporations, often have better access to politicians than
small groups. In a context of informational lobbying our paper suggests that the arguments
provided by big interest groups are more valuable for politicians than those provided by smaller
groups. This explains a higher willingness to grant them access.19 A bigger lobby in FS may
have to provide more evidence for persuasion, but this evidence is not more valuable for the
politician.
10 Conclusion
This paper studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a Bayesian receiver with
evidence that stems from sequential private experimentation and that can be selectively re-
vealed. In each equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated the sender runs a single experiment
even when he cares substantially about a favorable decision. To counteract the incentive for
excessive private experimentation he designs a single experiment with a suffi ciently high pre-
cision. If the outcome is unfavorable, then the probability of finding favorable evidence is too
low to justify the costs of further experimentation.
Our analysis suggests that the decision quality under private experimentation depends on
the sender’s stakes. We compare a situation where the sender has low stakes with a situation
where he has high stakes and find that the sender in any equilibrium that is not Pareto
dominated in the latter case provides higher quality information than in any equilibrium that
is not Pareto dominated in the former case. The receiver is strictly better off the more the
sender benefits from a favorable decision, as he has to provide higher quality evidence from
the single experiment that he runs in order to deter further experimentation.
The sender does not benefit from the option to experiment privately. As under public
experimentation he runs a single experiment, but the persuasion probability is lower. The
receiver, on the other hand, enjoys an advantage from the sender’s commitment problem. Since
the high precision of the revealed evidence is not diluted by further private experimentation,
the receiver obtains higher quality information than under public experimentation.
19There is a literature on lobbying where interested parties may buy access to a politician and only then
provide information (e.g., Cotton 2012). In a straightforward extension of our paper, a big lobby should find
it easier to approach a politician than a small lobby even without contributions and the lobby benefits from
getting access.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) As shown in the main text, the optimal experiment under public
experimentation has precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
). The receiver is persuaded to choose a1 after observ-
ing outcome s1. Otherwise she chooses a2. The expected utility from running the optimal
experiment, anticipating the receiver’s behavior, is 1
2
U + 1
2
(1− 2pd−1
pd
)U − c. It is smaller than
zero if U/c < 2pd. In this case the sender does not start to experiment.
(ii) Analogous to the proof of part (i) the sender is better off with equilibrium behavior
than not to experiment if U/c ≥ 2pd.
A positive outcome from the equilibrium experiment just persuades the receiver (given
that he does not observe additional outcomes). After an adverse outcome of this experiment
all players know that the state is ω = ω2. Running a further costly experiment in this case
does not change this posterior belief and is, therefore, not profitable.
Running a different first experiment (and potentially more experiments after some out-
come of the first experiment) cannot yield a higher ex ante persuasion probability than with
equilibrium behavior, as shown in part (iii) of the proof. Expected experimentation costs are
weakly higher with such a deviation. Hence, such a deviation is not profitable.
(iii) An upper bound for the persuasion probability in any equilibrium with persuasion can
be determined with the concavication approach. Let µ1 be the receiver’s posterior belief that
the state is ω1 upon observing the sender’s message. The persuasion probability depending
on µ1 and its concavication are illustrated in Figure 4.
prob{x=1}
1/2 µ1pd
0
1/2pd
0
1
Figure 4: Upper bound for the persuasion probability
The persuasion probability in any equilibrium cannot be above the concave closure evalu-
ated at the prior belief 1/2, i.e., in this case the upper bound is equal to 1
2pd
.
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Consider a potential equilibrium in which the sender runs only one experiment on the
equilibrium path and where this experiment does not have precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
). A deviation
for the sender is to run a single experiment with precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
). As discussed in section
4.2, the receiver’s posterior off-the-equilibrium path belief that the state is ω1 upon observing
a positive outcome s1 of this experiment is 1
1+(1− 2pd−1
pd
)
= pd and it is 0 upon observing an
adverse outcome s2. I.e., she is persuaded to choose a1 iff she observes a positive outcome of
this off-the-equilibrium path experiment. The persuasion probability with such an experiment
is 1
2
∗ 1 + 1
2
∗ (1 − 2pd−1
pd
) = 1
2pd
. The experiment in the potential equilibrium has a strictly
lower persuasion probability.20 Therefore, the deviation is profitable.
Consider a potential equilibrium in which the sender runs multiple experiments on the
equilibrium path. Suppose that the persuasion probability in this equilibrium is 1
2pd
. A
deviation for the sender is again to run a single experiment with precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
). The
deviation also implies the persuasion probability 1
2pd
. This probability is obtained with the
minimum number of (costly) experiments that the sender has to run for persuasion. Therefore,
the deviation is profitable. Analogously, there is no equilibrium with multiple experiments on
the equilibrium path that implies a persuasion probability that is smaller than 1
2pd
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: In the following we consider (A) an equilibrium with persuasion in which
there is no on the equilibrium path history that contains an infinite number of outcomes and
(B) a potential equilibrium with persuasion in which there is an on the equilibrium path
history that contains an infinite number of outcomes that are not part of some persuasive
message m∗ and no further outcome and (C) an equilibrium with persuasion in which there is
an on the equilibrium path history that contains an infinite number of outcomes that are not
part of some persuasive message m∗ and some further outcome(s). In contrast to (B), case
(C) allows for “infinite”histories that contain some evidence that is part of some persuasive
message m∗.
For the analysis of (A), (B) and (C) it is useful to note the following. The sender is better
off at a posterior µ1 if he has a stock of evidence that he can use for persuasion than if he
does not have such evidence. Hence, if it is sequentially rational that the sender continues
experimenting at posterior µ1 if he does not have evidence that is part of some persuasive
messagem∗ ∈M∗, then it is also sequentially rational for the sender to continue experimenting
at posterior µ1 if he has a stock of evidence that he can use for persuasion. Similarly, if it is
20An experiment with persuasion probability 12pd has to yield posteriors µ1 = 0 and µ1 = pd according
to Figure 4. Posterior µ1 = 0 can only be obtained with a single experiment τ if πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1. Given
πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1, the posterior µ1 = pd can only be obtained if 11+(1−πτ (s2|ω2)) = pd, which is equivalent to
πτ (s2 | ω2) = 2pd−1pd .
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sequentially rational for the sender to stop experimenting unsuccessfully at some posterior µ1
if he has a stock of evidence that is part of some persuasive message m∗ ∈M∗, then it is also
sequentially rational for the sender to stop experimenting at posterior µ1 if he does not have
a stock of evidence that he can use for persuasion.
(A) An equilibrium with persuasion requires that the sender stops experimenting unsuc-
cessfully at some history that implies some posterior µ1 < 1/2. If he instead in a hypothetical
equilibrium only stops unsuccessfully if µ1 ≥ 1/2, then a message indicating unsuccessful ex-
perimentation implies that the posterior from the receiver’s perspective is above 1/2. Bayesian
plausibility requires that the average posterior from the receiver’s perspective after successful
experimentation is below 1/2. The receiver’s posterior may depend on the revealed evidence,
but at least for some persuasive m∗ ∈ M∗ we have prob{ω = ω1 | m∗} < 1/2 < pd. But then
the receiver should not be persuaded by such a message yielding a contradiction.
If the sender stops unsuccessfully at some history that implies some posterior µ1 < 1/2
and that contains some evidence that is part of some persuasive message, then he also stops
experimenting unsuccessfully at a history that implies the same posterior µ1 and that does
not contain any evidence that is part of some persuasive message, as shown above. Therefore,
the sender stops experimenting unsuccessfully at some posterior µ1 < 1/2 if he has not yet
found an outcome that is part of some m∗ ∈ M∗ with which he can persuade the receiver to
choose a = a1 in such an equilibrium.
(B) Consider a potential equilibrium with persuasion in which there is an on the equilibrium
path history that contains an infinite number of outcomes that are not part of some persuasive
message m∗ and no further outcome. If the sender does not stop experimenting unsuccessfully
at any history h with µ1 < 1/2 if he has not yet found evidence that can be used for persuasion,
then he never stops unsuccessfully at any history with µ1 < 1/2 regardless of the stock of
evidence, as shown above. In the next paragraph we show that it is a zero probability event in
such a potential equilibrium that the sender runs an infinite number of experiments without
finding persuasive evidence. Stopping unsuccessfully may, thus, only occur if the sender faces
some history with µ1 > 1/2. Analogous to (A) there cannot be such an equilibrium, as this
implies via Bayesian plausibility that the posterior upon observing some persuasive message
is below 1/2, which contradicts that the receiver is persuaded upon observing such a message.
It remains to show that in such a potential equilibrium it is a zero probability event that the
sender runs an infinite number of experiments without finding persuasive evidence. At each
history h where a persuasive message is not feasible and where he runs an additional experi-
ment according to the equilibrium strategy, sequential rationality requires that the probability
to obtain persuasive evidence by future experimentation times U exceeds the costs c of the
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next experiment. A necessary condition for sequential rationality is, thus, that this probability
at each such history h is weakly above c
U
, with c
U
> 0. As the sender according to the potential
equilibrium continues experimenting at any such history h with µ1 < 1/2, the probability that
he runs an infinite number of experiments without finding persuasive evidence is zero.
(C) Analogous to (B) it is a zero probability event that the sender runs an infinite num-
ber of experiments without finding persuasive evidence. Analogous to (A) the sender stops
experimenting unsuccessfully at some posterior µ1 < 1/2 if he has not yet found an outcome
that is part of some m∗ ∈ M∗ with which he can persuade the receiver to choose a = a1 in
such an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: (i) There is no equilibrium with persuasion if U/c < 2pd, as it does not
pay to start experimenting even if the sender could persuade with the minimum number of
experiments required for persuasion and the maximum persuasion probability.
(ii) Consider a potential equilibrium with the following properties:
(1) The sender’s first experiment has precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
).
(2) The sender stops experimenting (successfully) at any history h that contains at least
one outcome στ = s1 of an experiment with πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
).
(3) The sender stops experimenting (unsuccessfully) at any history h with prob{ω = ω1 |
h} = 0 that does not contain at least one outcome στ = s1 of an experiment with πτ =
(1, 2pd−1
pd
).
(4) The sender sends message m∗ = (στ , πτ ) with πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
) for any outcome στ that
he observes after the first experiment.
(5) The sender’s remaining behavior off-the-equilibrium path is sequentially rational.
(6) The receiver chooses a = a1 if the sender sends message m∗ = (στ = s1, πτ ) with
πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
) of an experiment τ . The receiver also chooses a = a1 if the sender sends a
message m that contains at least one positive outcome from an experiment with precision
(q, 1), with q ∈ (0, 1]. Otherwise she chooses a2.
(7) On the equilibrium path, i.e., upon observing message m∗ = (στ , πτ ) with πτ =
(1, 2pd−1
pd
), beliefs are formed in accordance with Bayes’ Law. Upon observing an off-the-
equilibrium path message that does not contain at least one positive outcome from an exper-
iment with precision (q, 1), the receiver forms a probability assessment over experimentation
histories such that the probability that ω = ω1 conditional on this assessment is below the
threshold of doubt. E.g., she may believe that the sender privately ran a single additional
experiment with precision (1, 1) that yielded an adverse outcome. Off-the-equilibrium path
beliefs upon observing a message that contains at least one positive outcome from an experi-
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ment with precision (q, 1), with q ∈ (0, 1], are such that the receiver thinks that ω = ω1 with
certainty, as discussed in section 4.1.3.
We now show that (1) - (7) are consistent with an equilibrium. (5) and (7) are by con-
struction consistent with perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Sender behavior: Consider the sender’s message. If the sender stops experimenting and the
stock of collected experimental outcomes contains an outcome that induces action a1 if the
appropriate message is sent, then he sends such a message as a1 is the preferred action. If the
sender stops experimenting unsuccessfully, then he induces action a2 with any feasible message.
Therefore, sending any feasible message is optimal after unsuccessful experimentation.
We now have to check the sender’s equilibrium experimentation behavior described in
properties (1) - (3).
(A) Consider a deviation from equilibrium property (1). Analogous to public experimen-
tation, the sender is better off to start experimenting with an experiment with πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
)
than not to experiment as U/c ≥ 2pd. We now have to check whether the sender wants to
start experimenting with an experiment that does not have precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
). We distinguish
the cases (A.a) where he deviates by starting with an experiment with precision (q, 1), with
q ∈ (0, 1], and (A.b) where he deviates by starting with an experiment with a precision that
differs from (1, 2pd−1
pd
) and (q, 1).
(A.a) The sender does not have an incentive to start experimenting with an experiment
with precision (q, 1), with q ∈ (0, 1]: None of these experiments yields a positive outcome
in ω2. Running one such experiment yields a lower persuasion probability and the same
experimentation costs as equilibrium behavior and is, therefore, not profitable. If he runs
more than one experiment with a positive probability, then the ex ante upper bound for the
persuasion probability in state ω1 if he exclusively runs these experiments is 1 and it is 0 in
state ω2. If the sender later (sometimes) runs experiments with πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
), then it is
sequentially rational to stop after each realization, as implied by equilibrium properties (2)
and (3). In state ω2, the ex ante upper bound for the persuasion probability can then be
increased from 0 to (1− 2pd−1
pd
). Overall the persuasion probability is, therefore, weakly below
1 in state ω1 and weakly below (1− 2pd−1pd ) in state ω2. Therefore, the persuasion probability is
weakly below the persuasion probability if the sender starts with his on the equilibrium path
experiment (where it is 1 in state ω1 and (1− 2pd−1pd ) in state ω2), but expected experimentation
costs are above c. Hence, this deviation is not profitable.
(A.b) The sender does not have an incentive to start experimenting with an experiment
with a precision that differs from (1, 2pd−1
pd
) and (q, 1): Due to off-the-equilibrium path beliefs,
any outcome from such an experiment cannot be used for persuasion. The sender, therefore,
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does not have an incentive to start experimenting with such an experiment for the purpose of
inducing action a1 with this experiment. He may have an incentive to run such an experiment
in order to learn about the state. Learning can only be potentially profitable if the sender later
runs an experiment with precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
) and / or (q, 1) with a positive probability. If he
starts experimenting with an off-the-equilibrium path experiment, then the ex ante expected
experimentation costs of a potentially profitable deviation are, therefore, greater than c. Ex
ante the persuasion probability if the sender at some time after the first experiment runs
experiments with precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
) and / or (q, 1) with a positive probability and if he
behaves sequentially rational is weakly below 1 in state ω1 and weakly below (1 − 2pd−1pd ) in
state ω2, analogous to the argument in (A.a). Due to the lower persuasion probability and
the higher ex ante costs, the deviation is not profitable.
(B) Consider a deviation from equilibrium property (2). A deviation is not profitable, since
sending a message that exclusively contains στ = s1 and πτ induces his preferred action a1.
(C) Consider a deviation from equilibrium property (3). For any history h′ for which h
is a subhistory we have prob{ω = ω1 | h′} = 0 and according to equilibrium properties (2)
and (3) the sender stops experimenting for each such history h′. For sequential rationality we
have to check whether the sender can improve with a deviation at history h, without changing
the remaining parts of the equilibrium, as discussed in section 4.1.1. We distinguish the cases
(C.a) where he deviates by continuing experimentation at h with an experiment that does not
have precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
) and (C.b) where he deviates by continuing experimentation at h with
an experiment that has precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
).
(C.a) Consider a deviation at h in which the sender continues experimenting with a next
experiment that does not have precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
). An experiment that does not have
precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
) or precision (q, 1) cannot be used for persuasion due to off-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs (described in equilibrium property (7)) and it also does not contain new infor-
mation about the state, since the sender knows that ω = ω2. Since running it is costly, the
deviation is not profitable. An experiment that has precision (q, 1) instead does not yield a
positive outcome in state ω2 and, since it is costly, a deviation where this experiment is run
is also not profitable.
(C.b) Consider a deviation at h in which the sender continues experimenting with a next
experiment that has precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
). According to property (2) of this equilibrium he
stops experimenting successfully if this experiment yields outcome s1. According to property
(3) he stops experimenting unsuccessfully if it yields outcome s2, since the sender still knows
that the state is ω2. His continuation utility from running this experiment is (1− 2pd−1pd )U − c,
as prob{ω = ω1 | h} = 0 at h. Continuing experimentation is not optimal if (1− 2pd−1pd )U−c ≤
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0⇔ U/c ≤ pd
1−pd , which is satisfied.
Receiver behavior:
The receiver infers that the sender ran a single experiment if she observes a message
m∗ = (στ , πτ ), with πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
). She is persuaded by a message m∗ containing a positive
outcome from an experiment with precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
) if 1
1+(1− 2pd−1
pd
)
≥ pd, which is
satisfied.
(iii) Such a potential equilibrium requires that the sender stops experimenting after ob-
serving an adverse outcome s2 of an experiment with precision πτ = (1,
2pd−1
pd
). Analogous to
part (ii) of the proof he has an incentive to deviate. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: We cannot have V1(12) ≥ 0 and V2(
1
2
) > 0. In this case the sender could
(possibly suboptimally) at each posterior µ1 replicate the same behavior as at the prior where
he has not yet run an experiment, yielding V1(12) and V2(
1
2
) in the respective states with this
modified plan at posterior µ1.
21 As µ1 only allocates probability mass to V1(
1
2
) and to V2(12) in
µ1V1(
1
2
) + (1−µ1)V2(12) (and both are greater than zero), the sender’s benefit from continuing
to experiment with the modified plan is greater than zero. With the optimal plan he is weakly
better off. Therefore, he would not stop experimenting unsuccessfully for any posterior given
that he has not yet acquired an outcome that he can use for persuasion. This implies that
he never stops experimenting unsuccessfully for all posteriors µ1 < 1/2, which contradicts the
notion of an equilibrium with persuasion due to Lemma 2.
We cannot have V1(12) ≤ 0 and V2(
1
2
) > 0. In this case the sender could (possibly sub-
optimally) at each posterior µ1 < 1/2 replicate the same behavior as at the prior where he
has not yet run an experiment. In this case for any µ1 < 1/2, more probability mass would
be allocated to V2(12) than ex ante and less probability mass would be allocated to V1(
1
2
)
than ex ante. I.e., if 1
2
V1(
1
2
) + 1
2
V2(
1
2
) ≥ 0, then we have µ1V1(12) + (1 − µ1)V2(
1
2
) > 0 for all
µ1 < 1/2. Optimal behavior implies a weakly greater utility. This implies that he never stops
21“Replicating”behavior means the following. Consider a history h = {(στ , πτ )}τ=1,...,t, where the sender
has not yet found evidence that is part of some persuasive message and where he faces posterior µ1 < 1/2.
Consider further a history h′ = {(στ , πτ )}τ=1,...,t,...,t′ , with t′ ≥ t. Based on these histories construct an
artificial history h′′ as follows: Each (στ , πτ ) in h′′ is equal to (σt+τ , πt+τ ) in h′, with τ = 1, ..., z and
z = t′ − t.
The sender’s experimentation plan specifies for each history h (i) whether the sender continues or stops
experimenting and (ii) the precision of the next experiment if he continues experimenting. We say that the
sender from history h on replicates the same behavior as at the prior where he has not yet found evidence that
can be used for persuasion, if the sender facing history h runs the next experiment with precision π1 and at each
history h′ = {(στ , πτ )}τ=1,...,t,...,t′ , with t′ > t, he continues experimenting according to his experimentation
plan, as if he faces history h′′ instead of history h′.
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experimenting unsuccessfully for all posteriors µ1 < 1/2, which contradicts the notion of an
equilibrium with persuasion due to Lemma 2.
Therefore, 1
2
V1(
1
2
) + 1
2
V2(
1
2
) ≥ 0 requires V1(12) ≥ 0 and V2(
1
2
) ≤ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Consider a potential equilibrium with properties (1) - (7)
described in the main text. (1) - (7) are consistent with an equilibrium analogous to the proof
of Lemma 3 (ii).22
(ii) Call the equilibrium in which the sender on the equilibrium path runs exactly one
experiment and this experiment has precision (1, U−c
U
) “equilibrium SP”(where SP stands for
“sender preferred”). The sender’s ex ante utility in such an equilibrium is 1
2
(U − c) + 1
2
((1−
U−c
U
)U − c), which is equivalent to
(2)
1
2
(U − c).
We show that equilibrium SP is sender preferred if U/c ∈ [ pd
1−pd ,∞). In an equilibrium the
sender sends a message that contains at least n outcomes on the equilibrium path. The ex
ante expected utility in such an equilibrium is at most
(3)
1
2
(U − nc) + 1
2
V2
(
1
2
)
because, if ω = ω1, then the sender gets his highest utility if he finds an outcome that can be
used for persuasion in each experiment and if he can persuade the receiver after n experiments.
Note that we have V2(12) ≤ 0 in (3) due to Lemma 4.
We now show that the sender is strictly better off in equilibrium SP than in any other
equilibrium with persuasion.
(A) If all messages m∗ ∈M∗ that are sent on the equilibrium path contain more than one
outcome, then the equilibrium cannot be sender preferred as n ≥ 2 and V2
(
1
2
)
≤ 0 according
to Lemma 4.
22Suppose the sender observes s2 of the first experiment (which has precision πτ = (1, U−cU )). The sender’s
continuation utility from running a further experiment with this precision and then to stop after each realization
of this experiment is (1 − U−cU )U − c = 0. Therefore, it is optimal not to run this experiment. It is also not
optimal to run any other experiment. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 3 (ii), he does not have an incentive to
start with an experiment with a different precision. As the sender is indifferent to continue experimenting with
an experiment with precision πτ = (1, U−cU ) if he knows ω = ω2, he has a strict incentive to start experimenting
at the prior belief.
The receiver knows that the sender in equilibrium runs only one experiment, where this experiment has
precision πτ = (1, U−cU ). Upon observing an on the equilibrium path message containing a positive outcome,
she is persuaded to choose a1, as 11+(1−U−cU )
≥ pd due to U/c > pd1−pd .
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(B) There can be equilibria in which on the equilibrium path messages are sent that contain
only one outcome. For n = 1 the utility in (3) is weakly smaller than the utility in (2). We
show now that equilibrium SP is also strictly preferred by the sender to these equilibria. We
distinguish the following cases.
(a) Suppose an outcome of the first experiment that the sender runs is not an element of
some m∗ with n = 1. The sender needs to run a further experiment and V1(12) < (U − c).
Thus, the sender prefers equilibrium SP.
(b) Suppose an adverse outcome of the first experiment is an element of a message m∗ with
n = 1, but a positive outcome is not an element of some message m∗ with n = 1.
Suppose the sender on the equilibrium path runs only one experiment. By assumption
πτ (s1 | ω1) ≥ πτ (s1 | ω2) for all experiments τ , which implies prob{ω = ω1 | στ = s2} <
1/2 < pd. I.e., in such a hypothetical equilibrium the receiver should not be persuaded upon
observing a message that contains an adverse outcome and no other outcome. If the receiver
cannot be persuaded by such a message, then it cannot be equilibrium behavior for the sender
to run (only) the corresponding costly experiment, as not experimenting yields a higher payoff.
Suppose the sender on the equilibrium path runs multiple experiments. In this case V1(12) <
(U − c). Thus, the sender prefers equilibrium SP.
(c) Suppose a positive outcome of the first experiment is an element of a message m∗ with
n = 1 that is sent with positive probability on the equilibrium path. We now derive the
maximum ex ante utility of the sender in such a potential equilibrium and properties of such
a potential equilibrium. We then show that only equilibrium SP yields this utility.
Consider a potential equilibrium in which the precision of the first experiment is such
that the receiver is persuaded if the sender presents a positive outcome of this experiment.
The maximum V1(12) that can potentially be achieved is (U − c), since if ω = ω1 payoff
V1(
1
2
) = (U−c) implies persuasion with probability 1 with the minimum number of experiments
required for persuasion. V1(12) = (U−c) can be achieved in a potential equilibrium if and only
if πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1. Thus, in such an equilibrium the posterior is µ1 = 0 if the first experimental
outcome is adverse.
In such an equilibrium we cannot have that the sender continues running further exper-
iments if he knows that µ1 = 0 after observing an adverse outcome of the first experiment:
If the sender instead continues experimenting in equilibrium if the first outcome is adverse
knowing µ1 = 0, then he would not stop experimenting unsuccessfully in the following.
23 He
23Any following experiment does not change the posterior µ1 = 0, but at some later experiment the sender
may have found some evidence that he can use for persuasion. Hence, the sender in the following cannot be
worse off than in case the first outcome is adverse.
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would, thus, run experiments until he finds some persuasive m∗ ∈ M∗ regardless of the state
ω. But then the receiver should not be persuaded by such an m∗ yielding a contradiction.
As the sender stops experimenting if the first experiment yields an adverse outcome in
a hypothetical equilibrium with V1(12) = (U − c) the sender runs a single experiment on
the equilibrium path. This determines the structure of V2(12) in such an equilibrium. As
only one experiment is run on the equilibrium path, denoting this experiment τ , we have
V2(
1
2
) = (1 − πτ (s2 | ω2))U − c. The maximum V2(12) that can potentially be achieved in
equilibrium is 0, as V2(12) ≤ 0 according to Lemma 4. Maximizing V2(
1
2
) = (1−πτ (s2 | ω2))U−c
with respect to πτ (s2 | ω2) subject to the constraint V2(12) ≤ 0 yields πτ (s2 | ω2) =
U−c
U
which
implies that (1 − πτ (s2 | ω2))U − c = 0. It follows that in the potential equilibrium which
yields V1(12) = (U − c), we may also achieve V2(
1
2
) = 0. It is, therefore, established that
πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 is the only possibility to have V1(12) = (U − c) and, given that πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1,
πτ (s2 | ω2) = U−cU is the only precision in state ω2 that potentially yields V2(
1
2
) = 0 in
equilibrium. It follows that V1(12) = (U − c) and V2(
1
2
) = 0 can only be achieved if a single
experiment is run on the equilibrium path with precision (1, U−c
U
). An equilibrium in which
the sender on the equilibrium path runs a single experiment and this experiment has precision
(1, U−c
U
) corresponds to equilibrium SP.
(iii) The persuasion probability under public experimentation is 1
2pd
. The persuasion prob-
ability under private experimentation is U+c
2U
, which is U+c
2U
= 1
2pd
if U/c = pd
1−pd . As
U+c
2U
decreases in U/c, the persuasion probability is smaller if U/c > pd
1−pd . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) The proof for existence is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3
(ii).
(ii) We first show that each equilibrium in the class of equilibria that is not described in
(i) and where the sender runs only one experiment is Pareto dominated by some equilibrium
described in (i). Then we study equilibria in which the sender runs multiple experiments.
(1) Consider a potential equilibrium in which the sender runs only one experiment and
where this equilibrium is not described in (i). In such an equilibrium the sender runs an
experiment with some precision (q, p), with q ∈ [0, 1] and p ∈ [0, 1]. In the following we
distinguish the three cases p ∈ [U−c
U
,min{1; 2U−c
U
}], p ∈ [min{1; 2U−c
U
}, 1] and p < U−c
U
.
Suppose p ∈ [U−c
U
,min{1; 2U−c
U
}], i.e., there is an equilibrium as described in part (i) of the
proposition with πτ (s2 | ω2) = p. We compare the latter equilibrium, where πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1,
with an equilibrium where q < πτ (s1 | ω1). Since we assume that a positive outcome is more
likely in state ω = ω1 than in state ω = ω2, the receiver’s decision rule in both equilibria is
the same. She chooses a = a1 only if she observes a positive outcome. The receiver’s utility in
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state ω = ω1 increases in q, since she then observes the appropriate positive outcome with a
higher probability. In state ω = ω2 her utility is not affected by q. Hence, she is better off in
an equilibrium with a higher q. The sender’s utility in state ω = ω1 increases in q, since the
receiver’s decision rule in both equilibria is the same and he obtains a positive outcome with
a higher probability if q increases. The sender’s utility in state ω = ω2 does not depend on q.
Hence, he is better off in an equilibrium with a higher q. Hence, any such equilibrium with
precision (q, p = πτ (s2 | ω2)), with q < 1, is Pareto dominated by an equilibrium in which the
sender runs only one experiment and where the experiment has precision (1, πτ (s2 | ω2)).
Suppose p ∈ (min{1; 2U−c
U
}, 1]. Considermin{1; 2U−c
U
} < 1, i.e., parameters for which there
is no equilibrium as described in part (i) of the proposition with πτ (s2 | ω2) = p. In this case
there is no equilibrium with persuasion in which the only experiment run in equilibrium has
precision (q, p): An equilibrium condition is that the sender starts experimenting with such an
experiment. The ex ante payoff from running such an experiment is 1
2
(qU−c)+ 1
2
((1−p)U−c).
The sender by construction is indifferent to start experimenting with an experiment with
precision (1, 2U−c
U
) in this parameter range. Thus, he is strictly better off not to run an
experiment if q ≤ 1 and p > 2U−c
U
, since such an experiment implies a lower probability of an
outcome inducing a = a1.
Suppose p < U−c
U
, i.e., there is no equilibrium as described in part (i) of the proposition
with πτ (s2 | ω2) = p. Analogous to above the receiver’s utility increases in q and p. Therefore,
the receiver’s payoff in any such equilibrium is lower than in the sender preferred equilibrium,
where the sender runs only one experiment and this experiment has precision (1, U−c
U
). The
sender preferred equilibrium by definition is better for the sender than any other equilibrium.
Therefore, the sender’s payoff in the equilibrium where he runs only one experiment and
where this experiment has precision (1, U−c
U
) is also higher. Hence, any such equilibrium with
p < U−c
U
is Pareto dominated by the sender preferred equilibrium, where the sender runs only
one experiment and where this experiment has precision (1, U−c
U
).
(2) Consider an equilibrium in which the sender runs multiple experiments on the equilib-
rium path.
Given the sender’s and the receiver’s equilibrium strategy, we can determine prob{a =
a1 | ω = ω1} and prob{a = a2 | ω = ω2}. Construct a single experiment with precision
(q, p), with q = prob{a = a1 | ω = ω1} and p = prob{a = a2 | ω = ω2}. Suppose (possibly
suboptimally) that the sender runs exclusively this experiment and reveals the outcome after
each realization and that the receiver chooses a = a1 only after a positive outcome of this
experiment. Denote this as (auxiliary) situation A. The receiver by construction is ex ante as
well off in situation A as in the equilibrium with the multiple experiments. The persuasion
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probability in the equilibrium and in situation A by construction are the same. Expected
experimentation costs for the sender if he runs a single experiment are lower. Hence, the sender
is better off in situation A with the single experiment than in the equilibrium with multiple
experiments. In the following we again distinguish the three cases p ∈ [U−c
U
,min{1; 2U−c
U
}],
p ∈ [min{1; 2U−c
U
}, 1] and p < U−c
U
.
Suppose p ∈ [U−c
U
,min{1; 2U−c
U
}], i.e., there is an equilibrium as described in part (i) of
the proposition with πτ (s2 | ω2) = p. Situation A yields a lower payoff for the sender than
the equilibrium in which he runs one experiment and where this experiment has precision
(1, p), since the persuasion probability in the latter is higher and the experimentation costs
are the same. As the sender’s payoff in situation A is higher than in the equilibrium with the
multiple experiments, the equilibrium in which he runs one experiment and this experiment
has precision (1, πτ (s2 | ω2) = p) also yields a higher ex ante payoff than the equilibrium with
multiple experiments. By construction the receiver is equally well off in situation A as in the
equilibrium with multiple experiments. As the receiver’s ex ante payoff increases in q, she is
better off in the equilibrium in which the sender runs one experiment and this experiment
has precision (1, πτ (s2 | ω2) = p) than in situation A. Hence, she is also better off in the
equilibrium in which the sender runs only one experiment and this experiment has precision
(1, πτ (s2 | ω2) = p) than in the equilibrium in which he runs multiple experiments. Hence,
the equilibrium in which the sender runs only one experiment and where this experiment has
precision (1, πτ (s2 | ω2) = p) Pareto dominates the equilibrium with multiple experiments.
Suppose p ∈ (min{1; 2U−c
U
}, 1] with min{1; 2U−c
U
} < 1. Analogous to above, there can be
no equilibrium in which the sender runs multiple experiments, as the equilibrium condition
that he starts experimenting is violated in this case.
Suppose p < U−c
U
, i.e., there is no equilibrium as described in part (i) of the proposition
with πτ (s2 | ω2) = p. The equilibrium in which the sender runs only one experiment and this
experiment has precision (1, U−c
U
) is better for the sender than the equilibrium in which he
runs multiple experiments, as the former is globally sender preferred. The receiver prefers the
equilibrium in which the sender runs one experiment that has precision (1, U−c
U
) to situation
A, as q ≤ 1 and p < U−c
U
and her payoff increases in p and q. As situation A is equally
good for the receiver as the equilibrium with multiple experiments, the receiver prefers the
sender preferred equilibrium to the equilibrium in which the sender runs multiple experiments.
Hence, the sender preferred equilibrium in which the sender runs only one experiment and
where this experiment has precision (1, U−c
U
) Pareto dominates the equilibrium with multiple
experiments if p < U−c
U
.
(iii) The receiver’s ex ante payoff increases in πτ (s2 | ω2), but the sender’s ex ante payoff
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decreases in πτ (s2 | ω2). Therefore, we cannot rank the equilibria described in part (i) of the
proposition according to the Pareto criterion. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) Sender preferred equilibrium: The precision of the experiment
run in this equilibrium is (1, U−c
U
), where U−c
U
strictly increases in U/c.
Receiver preferred equilibrium: The precision of the experiment run in this equilibrium is
(1,min{1; 2U−c
U
}), where min{1; 2U−c
U
} weakly increases in U/c.
(ii) Sender preferred equilibrium: As πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 does not change and πτ (s2 | ω2)
strictly increases in U/c according to (i), it follows that the persuasion probability strictly
decreases in U/c.
Receiver preferred equilibrium: As πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 does not change and πτ (s2 | ω2) weakly
increases in U/c according to (i), it follows that the persuasion probability weakly decreases
in U/c.
(iii) Sender preferred equilibrium: As πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 does not change and πτ (s2 | ω2)
strictly increases in U/c according to (i), the statement directly follows.
Receiver preferred equilibrium: As πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 does not change and πτ (s2 | ω2) weakly
increases in U/c according to (i), the statement directly follows. Q.E.D.
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